

“Another Chapter in the Pursuit of Reconciliation and Redress...”

A Summary of *Daniels v. Canada* at the Supreme Court of Canada

About This Document

This is a summary of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in *Daniels v. Canada*, 2016 SCC 12 (“*Daniels*”). It has been prepared for the Métis National Council (“MNC”) and its Governing Members. It is not legal advice and should not be relied on as such. It does not necessarily represent the views of the MNC or its Governing Members.

Who Was Involved in the Case?

The representative plaintiffs were well-known Métis leader Harry Daniels (now deceased), Gabriel Daniels (Harry’s son), Leah Gardner (a non-status Indian from Ontario), Terry Joudrey (a non-status Mi’kmaq from Nova Scotia) and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (the “Plaintiffs”). The case was filed against the federal government as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (“Canada”).

At the Supreme Court of Canada, the MNC, Métis Settlements General Council and Gift Lake Métis Settlement intervened on behalf of the Métis Nation. Groups such as the Assembly of First Nations and Chiefs of Ontario amongst others intervened on behalf of First Nations and non-status Indians. Alberta and Saskatchewan also intervened.

What Did the Plaintiffs Ask For?

The Plaintiffs asked for three judicial declarations:

1. that Métis and non-status Indians are in s. 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*;
2. that the federal Crown owes a fiduciary duty to Métis and non-status Indians; and
3. that Métis and non-status Indians have the right to be consulted and negotiated with, in good faith, by the federal government on a collective basis through representatives of their choice.

A declaration is a common court remedy in Aboriginal claims cases. A court declares the law in relation to a dispute between government and Aboriginal peoples. The parties are then expected to change their behavior to be consistent with the law.

What the Supreme Court Said

What is Section 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*?

In 1867, when Canada was created—as a new country—various “jurisdictions” were divided up between Parliament and provincial legislatures. Parliament was assigned “exclusive Legislative Authority” for “Indians, and Land reserved for the Indians” through s. 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*. This jurisdiction was assigned to Canada to achieve “the broader goals of Confederation,” which included expansion into Rupert’s Land and the North-Western Territory as well as building a national railway to British Columbia (para. 25).



“The Métis Nation was ... crucial in ushering in western and northern Canada into Confederation and in increasing the wealth of the Canadian nation by opening up the prairies to agriculture and settlement. These developments could not have occurred without Métis intercession and legal presence.”

— *Daniels*, para. 16 (citing Professor John Borrows)

Section 91(24) provided Parliament, and, by extension, the federal government, the “authority over *all* Aboriginal peoples” in order to facilitate the “westward expansion of the Dominion” (para. 25). This expansion was advanced through Canada’s treaty making, agreements and alliances with the diverse Aboriginal populations it encountered. These “relationships” with Aboriginal groups allowed the federal government to “protect the railway from attack” and to smooth the way for settlement (para. 25).

The “Indians” in s. 91(24) included *all* of the Aboriginal peoples within Canada in 1867 as well as those to be encountered as the country expanded (para. 46). Notably, in the “western territories,” the Aboriginal peoples encountered included various Indian tribes, bands, etc. (*i.e.*, First Nations) as well as the Métis (*i.e.*, the Métis Nation) (para. 16; see also *Manitoba Metis Federation v. Canada*, para. 2). Both of these groups—First Nations and Metis—were considered “Indians” within s. 91(24) because they were indigenous to the territory and necessary “partners in Confederation” (para. 37).

In modern times, s. 91(24) continues to be about advancing Parliament’s “relationship with all of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples,” thereby making “reconciliation with *all* of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples is Parliament’s goal” (paras. 36-37). The Court notes, however, that s. 91(24)’s “relationship” function plays a “very different constitutional purpose” than s. 35 (paras. 37, 49) as explained further below.

Why Does Inclusion in Section 91(24) Matter to Métis and Non-Status Indians?

The Court held that uncertainty about whether Métis and non-status Indians are in s. 91(24) has left them in a “jurisdictional wasteland with significant and obvious disadvantaging consequences.” The Court upheld the Trial Judge’s findings that the “political football—buck passing” tactics of governments towards these groups had “produced a large population of collaterally damaged” people (para. 14). While inclusion in s. 91(24) doesn’t create a duty on to legislate, the granting of a declaration that these groups are included in s. 91(24) provides them with “certainty and accountability” about “where to turn for policy redress” and has an “undeniable salutary benefit” (paras. 15, 50).

“With federal and provincial governments refusing to acknowledge jurisdiction over them, Métis and non-status Indians have no one to hold accountable for an inadequate status quo.”

— *Daniels*, para. 15

Why Non-Status Indians Are Included in Section 91(24)

At the hearing of the appeal, Canada conceded that non-status Indians are in s. 91(24). The Court noted that Canada’s concession was not determinative, so answering the legal question still had practical utility. **As such, a declaration that non-status Indians are in s. 91(24) was issued (paras. 20, 50).** The Court also noted that since *all* Aboriginal peoples are in s. 91(24) (and non-status Indians are included within those peoples) any “definitional ambiguities” about who non-status Indians are did not preclude a judicial determination that they are in s. 91(24) as a starting point (para. 19) with specifics to be “decided on a case-by-basis in the future” (para. 47).

Why Métis Are Included in Section 91(24)

In order to achieve its expansionist goals, Canada needed to facilitate positive “relationships” with the large and diverse Aboriginal population it encountered. This included dealing with the Métis—as “Indians” under s. 91(24)—both prior to and post Confederation. **As such, the Court issued a declaration that the Métis are included in s. 91(24) (para. 50).** In order to support its conclusion, the Court noted:

- Métis were considered “Indians” for the purposes of pre-Confederation treaties such as the Robinson Treaties of 1850 (para. 24).
- Many post-Confederation statutes considered Métis to be “Indians” (para. 24), including an amendment to the *Indian Act* in 1894 to include “Halfbreeds” in liquor prohibitions (para. 27).
- Canada’s jurisdiction needed to be broad enough to include the Métis because they posed a real threat to the country’s “expansionist agenda” (paras. 25-26).
- The “Métis Nation was ... crucial in ushering western and northern Canada into Confederation ... These developments could not have occurred without Métis intercession and legal presence” (para. 26).

- Although applied haphazardly, the federal government’s residential school policy encompassed Métis, including establishing a federally funded industrial school at Saint-Paul-des-Métis in Alberta (paras. 28-30).
- In the early 20th Century, the federal government continued to be willing to recognize Métis as “Indians” whenever it was convenient to do so, including, the issuance of Métis scrip and moving Métis in and out of treaties and the *Indian Act* (paras. 31-32).
- In 1980, a federal Cabinet document acknowledged that “Métis people ... are presently in the same legal position as other Indians who signed land cession treaties” and those Métis who received scrip are still “Indians” within the meaning of s. 91(24) (para. 33).

The Court held that the term “Indians” in s. 91(24) could be equated to the way we use the term “Aboriginal” today (*i.e.*, it includes all the Aboriginal peoples in s. 35). It also noted that it would be strange for the Métis to be excluded from s. 91(24), while all other Aboriginal peoples enumerated in s. 35 were included (para. 35).

The Court distinguished its decision in *R. v. Blais* where it held Métis were not included as “Indians” in Manitoba’s *Natural Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930*. It noted that *Blais* was about whether Métis were included in a specific constitutional agreement, while this case was about jurisdiction in the Constitution (paras. 44-45).

“The [1982] constitutional changes, the apologies for historic wrongs, a growing appreciation that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people are partners in Confederation, ... all indicate that reconciliation with *all* of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples is Parliament’s goal”

Daniels, para. 37

Métis Inclusion as Section 91(24) “Indians” Does Not Compromise Métis Distinctiveness


Since the term “Indians” in s. 91(24) includes all of the Aboriginal peoples recognized in s. 35, the Court emphasized that Métis inclusion in s. 91(24) does not undermine Métis distinctiveness—as a unique Aboriginal people—in any way. The Court emphasized that “[t]here is no doubt that the Métis are a distinct people” and noted it has previously recognized Métis communities in both Alberta and Manitoba as a “culturally distinct Aboriginal people” (paras. 42-43). The Court also highlighted that the Inuit—who have their own history, language, culture and separate identities from “Indian tribes” or First Nations—are already recognized as “Indians” in s. 91(24) and their distinctiveness has not been compromised through this inclusion (paras. 39, 41).

Section 35 Rights and Definitional Issues Are Addressed Downstream from Jurisdiction

Since *Daniels* was not about whether Métis or non-status Indian communities possess Aboriginal rights or claims recognized by s. 35, the Court found “there is no need to delineate which mixed-ancestry communities are Métis and which are non-status Indians” at this determination of jurisdiction stage. Essentially, all of these groups are included in s. 91(24) “by virtue of the fact that they are all Aboriginal peoples” (para. 46).

Determining whether “particular individuals or communities” are in s. 91(24) are “fact-driven question[s] to be decided on a case-by-case basis” (para. 47). At the jurisdiction stage, “community acceptance” is not required because the net is widely cast to include *all* Aboriginal peoples, including, “people who may no longer be accepted by their communities because they were separated from them as a result, for example, of government policies such as Indian Residential Schools” (paras. 46-49).

The Court, however, went on to highlight that Métis or non-status Indian inclusion in s. 91(24) is not the same as being recognized as a rights-bearing community or rights-holder for the purpose of s. 35 (para. 49). Section 91(24) serves “a very different constitutional purpose” than s. 35. Section 91(24) casts a wide net and deals with Parliament’s “relationships” with *all* Aboriginal peoples. Section 35, on the other hand, protects “historic community-held rights” and calls for the just settlement of rights and claims (paras. 34, 49, *Haida Nation v. BC*, paras. 20, 25). In effect, rights and definitional issues are answered *downstream* from jurisdiction. The visual below attempts to illustrate the interplay of ss. 91(24) and 35.



The Court reaffirmed that in the Métis context, the criteria in *R. v. Powley* must still be met to establish Métis rights (paras. 48-49). In the non-status Indian community context, *R. v. Van der Peet* likely applies or an individual must show they are a descendant/beneficiary of a treaty or a non-status member of a First Nation community.

Specifically, in relation to Métis rights, the *Powley* criteria for establishing a rights-bearing Métis community or identifying rights-holders (*i.e.*, self-identification, ancestral connection to the historic community and community acceptance) still applies (paras. 48-49). *Daniels* does not change these requirements. As the Court previously held,

It is important to remember that, no matter how a contemporary community defines membership, only those members with a demonstrable ancestral connection to the historic community can claim a s. 35 right. Verifying membership is crucial, since individuals are only entitled to exercise Métis aboriginal rights by virtue of their ancestral connection to and current membership in a Métis community. (*Powley*, para. 34)

This issue is particularly important for those Métis groups who rely on their registration systems for the identification of rights-holders and asserting s. 35 Métis rights for the purposes of Crown consultation, harvesting, *etc.* *Daniels* does not mean that anyone who claims to be “Métis” under s. 91(24) is now a s. 35 Métis rights-holder or could be “accepted” for such a purpose without still meeting the criteria set out in *Powley*.

Provincial Legislation Including Métis and Non-Status Indians Not Automatically Invalid

The Court held that provincial laws pertaining to Métis and non-status Indians are not inherently beyond the scope of provincial legislatures (para. 51). Provinces can pass laws in relation to provincial areas of jurisdiction, which affect or specifically deal with Métis or non-status Indians, as long as those laws do not impair the core of s. 91(24). The *Métis Settlements Act* (Alberta), *The Métis Act* (Saskatchewan) or *Métis Nation of Ontario Secretariat Act* (Ontario) are all examples of this type of permissible provincial law, wherein provinces have acted in their respective jurisdictional spheres.

The Crown is in a Fiduciary Relationship with Métis and Non-Status Indians

The Court reaffirmed based on *Delgamuukw v. BC* and *Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada* that the Crown is in a fiduciary relationship with all Aboriginal peoples, including, Métis and non-status Indians. The Court did not issue a declaration on this issue because it would just be “restating settled law” (para. 53).

“The relationship between the Métis and the Crown, viewed generally, is fiduciary in nature.”

— *Manitoba Métis Federation*,
para. 48

The Duty to Negotiate with Métis and Non-Status Indians

The Court reaffirmed based on *Haida Nation v. BC*, *Tsilhqot'in Nation v. BC* and *Powley* that “a context-specific duty to negotiate” exists “when Aboriginal rights are engaged.” This duty is not triggered by mere inclusion in s. 91(24); however, it applies where Métis or non-status Indian communities have credible or established s. 35 rights or claims. Again, the Court did not issue a declaration on this issue because to do so would have been “a restatement of the existing law” (para. 56).

This is a particularly significant development for Métis communities from Ontario westward whose s. 35 rights and/or claims have already been recognized by courts and/or provincial governments but who yet find that the federal government does not have any negotiation processes available to them. Further, they are excluded from Canada’s specific and comprehensive claims policies available to First Nations and the Inuit. This clear statement from the Court that there is a duty to negotiate (related to but distinct from the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate) will be helpful to all Aboriginal peoples.

The Implications of *Daniels* for the Métis Nation

Nothing immediately changes for Métis based on the *Daniels* judgment. For example, Métis are not now registered as “status Indians” under the *Indian Act* or eligible to be registered as such. Various federal programs and services available to status Indians and Inuit are not now available to Métis (*i.e.*, non-insured health benefits, post-secondary education funding, etc.). Métis are not now eligible for tax exemptions available to some status Indians.

Going forward, however, it will be incumbent on Canada to move forward on several fronts with the authorized representatives of rights-bearing Métis communities. Given the Court's clarity in relation to jurisdiction, the fiduciary relationship and the duty to negotiate, the status quo is not an option.

For example, based on the Crown's duty to negotiate—where there are established or credible Métis rights and claims that implicate federal jurisdiction (*i.e.*, claims against the federal Crown, issues that go to the “core” of s. 91(24) such as Métis identification, self-government, *etc.*)—the ongoing exclusion of Métis from *all* federal negotiation processes cannot be sustained. Clearly, some type of federal negotiation and/or claims process for Métis must be established in order to meet the constitutional duty the Court reaffirmed. If not, rights-bearing Métis communities will likely turn to the courts again—this time for orders in relation to some type of negotiation processes being made available to them.

In addition, the policy rationales for Métis exclusion from a majority of federal programs and benefits (*i.e.*, non-insured health benefits, education supports, *etc.*) that are made available to other s. 91(24) “Indians” (*i.e.*, Inuit, status Indians, *etc.*) will likely need to be reviewed to assess if ongoing exclusion is justifiable. Notably, some of the arguments recently accepted by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal with respect to the discrimination faced by First Nation communities in relation to child and family services have parallels to the situation faced by Métis communities. In particular, federal programs for First Nations and Inuit that deal with right-related issues will be particularly vulnerable to challenge since Métis exclusion could not be justified pursuant to s. 15(2) of the *Charter*.

It is also very likely that Tom Isaac's report (the federally appointed Ministerial Special Representative on Métis s. 35 rights) will inform what Canada does next. Mr. Isaac's report will likely be finalized and made publicly available in the next few months. For details visit: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1433442735272/1433442757318>.

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